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Abstract 
In this paper, I make a case for a philosophy of continuous matter, in dialogue with 
object-oriented ontology. A continuous-matter philosophy is one that focuses not on 
the identity, properties and relations of discrete, countable objects, but on the nature 
of extended substances, both in relation to human experience and in terms of their 
own ‘inner life’. I explore why and under what conditions humans might perceive the 
world as objects or as continuous substances, and the language that humans use for 
talking about both of them.  I argue that approaching the world as continua requires 
the foregrounding of concepts that emphasise the immanent (internal to a region of 
space), the inclusive (with contrasting properties coexisting in the same substance), 
the gradual (manifesting differentially at different points) and the generative or virtual 
(involving the constant production of form and new gradients).  I suggest that starting 
philosophy from continuous matter rather than objects also has wider implications 
for speculative thought. 
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Speculative realism is a welcome attempt to think outside of a Neo-Kantian 
assumption that human thought can never get beyond how things appear to humans 
and grasp how they are ‘in themselves’.  Within that broad movement, object-
oriented ontology (OOO), as developed by Graham Harman, Timothy Morton and 
others, helps us think about how nonhuman entities of all varieties might have a life 
of their own, one that exceeds human knowledge and understanding, and engage in 
relations with each other in which humans may have no role.  But can a speculative 
philosophy that starts from individuated, countable objects and sees the world 
through that lens really do justice to the ‘real’?   In this paper I will explore how and 
why we might grant independent ontological status to continuous, non-individuated 
kinds of matter such as air, water, rock or metal that are not collections of objects or 
parts of objects, and what this might mean for speculative thought. 
Object-oriented theorists, by definition, have a ‘thing ontology’ (Steen 2016; Esfeld 
2020). Thing ontologies regards the world as fundamentally composed of countable, 
concrete, individual entities such as atoms, primary substances – or in their case 
‘objects’.  A continuous-matter philosophy, by contrast, would be a ‘stuff ontology’ – 
in that it would involve the assertion that there are entities that exist that are not 
countable things.  In this paper I want to try to stretch speculative thought in this 
direction – not just beyond the human sensorium, but beyond objects, and in 
particular into the realm of continuous matter.  
I will not be presenting here a full articulation of a continuous-matter philosophy; 
instead I will simply try to ‘clear the ground’ for such a task, guided by the following 
questions: What is the place of volumes of matter without clear boundaries or internal 
structure in human existence? How might we also build speculative thought about 
continuous matter’s own ‘inner life’, independent of what it is for us?  And might such 
an exploration have wider implications for speculative thought?  In exploring these 
questions I will draw materials from the empirical sciences, including physics. Thus, 
like other speculative realists and new materialists with whose thinking my own has 
some affinity, such as Iain Hamilton Grant (2006), Karen Barad (2007) and Jane 
Bennett (2010), my approach will be to some extent ‘naturalistic’, drawing on natural 
scientific understandings of reality. However, I will be problematising object thinking 
not with the exotic but fashionable physics of quantum mechanics and the very small, 
but the more familiar macroscale physics of materials, substances and elements.  And 
I will also be drawing on other empirical disciplines, including psychology, linguistics, 
anthropology and intellectual history. 
In the next section I talk about the way that continuous-matter physics can serve as 
an inspiration both for the very idea of a continuous-matter philosophy and for the 
sort of concepts we might use to develop it.  In the following two sections I focus on 
objects, first exploring the grammar that we use to talk about them, and the physical, 
biological and cultural reasons why human beings might see the world in terms of 
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objects, and then introducing the object-oriented ontology of Harman and Morton.  
In the following two sections I turn to continua, and the language we use to describe 
them, whether they appear as materials for human projects or as the surrounding 
elemental conditions for human and more-than-human life. I suggest that a 
continuous substance ontology might be more fundamental to human experience 
than is often recognised. I then turn to the question of how we might think of 
continua in themselves, proposing that approaching the world as continua requires 
the foregrounding of concepts that emphasise the immanent (internal to a region of 
space), the inclusive (with contrasting properties coexisting in the same substance), 
the gradual (manifesting differentially at different points) and the generative or 
virtual (involving the constant production of form and new gradients).  I close by 
suggesting that starting philosophy from continuous matter rather than from objects 
could have wider implications for speculative thought. 
 
From physics to speculation  
If speculative thought is to take seriously how human and more-than-human 
existence are conditioned by taking place within a differentiated and self-
differentiating planet (see Clark, Szerszynski 2021), an object-oriented ‘thing’ 
ontology could be seen as an unpromising place to start. The Earth as a whole, moving 
in the interplanetary void, may qualify as a bounded, self-identical object (a status it 
achieved through a long process involving accretion, gravitational differentiation and 
dissipative earth-system phenomena). But within the extended body of the Earth, 
defined to include its atmosphere, discrete objects separated by a medium and in 
relation or interaction with each other are arguably the exception rather than the rule.  
Most of the Earth consists of vast, extended volumes of matter.  At a smaller scale, 
even individual objects have continuous matter within them, upon which we might 
want to reflect without reducing it either to the object of which it is a part or to the 
status of an individual component.   
The term ‘continuous-matter philosophy’ is modelled on ‘continuous-matter 
physics’, the name for an area of physics that treats matter as if it were not made of 
atoms and molecules but instead were infinitely divisible (Lautrup 2005). Physicists 
approach the phenomena exhibited in matter at the macroscopic scale at which we 
encounter it – the rigidity, elasticity and plasticity of solid bodies; the flow, viscosity, 
turbulence, vortices and surface tension of fluids; gravity, density, pressure and 
buoyancy; the conservation of mass, momentum and energy – not as if matter were 
made up of individual atoms and molecules, but as if it were a continuous substance. 
This is ‘continuous-matter physics’.  
The epistemology and ontology of this kind of physics can be described in a number 
of ways. Firstly, continuous-matter physics can be seen as a purely methodological 
device, a useful and efficient approximation that can be used to describe the 
behaviour of matter at the macroscopic scale where precise molecular structure and 
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processes have only a negligible role.  Viewed this way, continuous-matter physics is 
a limit of statistical physics, when the number of molecules and molecular 
interactions becomes effectively infinite (Lautrup 2005: 6).   
But we can also regard the very possibility of a continuous-matter physics as pointing 
to something ontologically significant. It is because behaviour at the macroscopic 
scale is compatible with a diverse range of phenomena or ontological entities at the 
microscopic scale that continuous-matter physics is possible.  This suggests that 
different spatio-temporal scalar levels can operate as more-or-less isolated ‘causal 
domains’, which has major philosophical implications for our conceptions of the real.  
Furthermore, continuous-matter physics involves a very different way of looking at 
matter.  As Lautrup puts it, in this branch of physics, ‘material particles are taken to 
be truly infinitesimal and properties are described as smooth, continuous functions 
of space and time. Continuum physics is therefore a theory of fields’ (2005: 9).   
Ideas from continuous-matter physics, as we shall see, can provide interesting 
material for speculation. Once we leave the world of individuated objects – that are 
the kind of object they are because of their composition and internal structure, and 
that can be in different kinds of relation with other objects – much of our 
conventional philosophical vocabulary – of identity and difference, of essence and 
accident, of kind and individual, of relation and non-relation – starts to founder.  We 
need to find or develop analogues to such concepts that are appropriate for a 
continuous-matter philosophy – analogues which may not always follow the same 
logic as the concepts that we use for objects – and for that, continuous-matter physics 
concepts such as fields can be very useful.  But before we focus on continua and how 
to think about them, let us first look at what we mean by objects.  
 
Objects 
Objects are by definition individuated entities.  This typically involves clear spatio-
temporal boundaries, but the grammar of how we talk about objects reveals what are 
perhaps more fundamental features of the idea of an object – things like identity and 
quantification. Thus objects can be counted, can take the definite or indefinite article, 
can be qualified by terms like ‘this’ or another’.  Objects can also take predicates – we 
can talk about a green ‘x’ and a blue one.  Objects typically – but not always - have an 
inner structure, which contributes to them being the ‘sort’ or ‘kind’ of objects that 
they are – that they are a tree and not a log, a television and not a computer.  This 
means that if we divide an object of a certain kind, although we may then have two 
objects these are not normally two objects belonging to the same class as the original 
one. Objects also have relations of different sorts with other objects – causal, spatial, 
functional, intentional, logical relations and so on.  And these relations can be 
internal –an intrinsic property of the object that helps make the object what it is – or 
external and accidental. 
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Findings from psychology can be a useful way in here, especially those exploring 
human object perception before it is indelibly shaped by culture and language. 
Cognitive psychologist Elizabeth Spelke and colleagues (Spelke et al. 1995) define the 
four main principles that seem to structure the perception of something as an object 
in the world.  Infants seem initially to apply these in a way that is suitable for the 
everyday physical objects that they typically encounter – people, cups, toys, dogs – 
learning how to separate them from their environment, from each other, but also as 
a particular class of phenomena that are distinct from some other existents that they 
encounter, especially those that are fluid.  The first principle, which helps to define 
the boundary and identity of an object, is the principle of cohesion: that the parts of 
an object move together, defining both the boundary of the object and the kind of 
object it is.  The other three principles are more about how objects should behave: the 
principles of continuity, in both space and time (objects do not bilocate, or wink in and 
out of existence), solidity (objects do not pass through each other) and contact (objects 
– other than goal-directed agents such as people – only affect each other if they 
touch) – though note that the last three principles apply not only to objects, but also 
to amorphous substances like ‘ground’ (Bloom 2000: 97).  As children develop, and 
expand their range of experiences, these principles seem to be not so much 
abandoned, as bent and stretched, as the child learns that there are different kinds of 
object – such as animate and inanimate – to which these principles apply in different 
ways.  
Later we will have reason to re-examine how exactly pre-linguistic infants experience 
the world. But there are certainly many reasons why human beings might indeed be 
constituted in a way that primes them to regard the world as made up of ‘things’.  
After all, we are creatures of a particular kind of realm in the extended body of the 
Earth: the interface zone between its solid and fluid compartments.   We do not just 
inhabit this realm; we are a product of it.  Objects at our kind of scale can be seen as 
parts of the Earth’s surface that have broken away. Indeed, from a planetary mobilities 
perspective, motile animals including human beings, and the machines that humans 
use to transport themselves and other things, can be regarded as a special case of 
discretised solids that the Earth generated as a as a solution to the problem of how to 
move solid matter around more easily (Haff 2010; Szerszynski 2016).    
The nature of our animal bodies also arguably biases us towards objects.  Our sheer 
size is important (Haldane 1928); even the horizontal division between the solid Earth 
as an object and the sky as a largely empty medium is far less clear to insects and other 
small creatures, for whom the ground as a surface generally dissolves into an 
entangled volume (Ingold 2011: 119), and for whom even the air can sometimes feel 
like a viscous enveloping substance.  Also, the topology of our bodies – the bodies of 
motile gut-based heterotrophs (Butterfield 2011) – may prime us to see the world as 
objects, whether they are motile ones that are above or below us in trophic chains of 
predator and prey species, or static ones that we can put in our mouths and chew.  
Plants, with their ability to photosynthesise, are autotrophs, and are thus probably 
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more oriented to the mass nouns of sun and rain and soil (Marder 2013).  Even fungi, 
which like us are heterotrophs, ‘eat’ not by enveloping but by penetrating solid media 
with their hyphae.  Our motion too can make the world seem more discrete – we 
encounter things, and leave them behind. Our hands are evolved to  grip, manipulate, 
sense and communicate, and help to turn things into objects (Tallis 2003).   
But human culture and language also shape object thinking.  According to some, the 
western and modern emphasis on things rather than processes, and on individuated 
objects rather than participatory ‘dwelling’, comes from an emphasis on sight as a 
way of knowing (Jay 1993; Levin 1993).  The very word ‘object’, after all, comes from 
the Medieval Latin obiectum ‘a thing put before (the mind or sight)’.2  And sight more 
than other senses does seem to split subject and object, to create a distance between 
the two, and to individuate object from object.   
However, this might not always have been the case. In classical Greece, apprehending 
the form of an object was not experienced in a Cartesian way, as sense impressions 
from a silent world being made intelligible by the mind; to experience a form was 
understood as possible because both subject and object always already participated in 
an ordered physical, moral and aesthetic cosmos (Dupré 1993: 19).  Anthropologist 
Tim Ingold (2000b) argues that it is not sight per se but a particular culturally learned 
way of seeing that is to blame for objectification. Romanyshyn (1989) links the rise of 
this world-orientation to that of linear perspective, whereas Walter Ong (1982: 72) 
argues that it was the move from oral to literate and particularly alphabetic cultures 
that transformed the experience of sight, encouraging an atomising, distancing 
stance to a world now seen as made up as ‘carpentered’ objects.  The English language 
seems especially oriented towards object-thinking – suggesting that it may not be a 
coincidence that OOO flourishes particularly in the Anglosphere. Ingold insists that 
a ‘pre-objective level of perception’ remains in some sense as a substrate to object-
oriented human experience: ‘behind the discovery, whether visual or auditory, of a 
world already made’, he insists, ‘there lies …  a level at which sensory awareness rides 
on the cusp of the very movement of the world’s coming-into-being’ (2000a: 254).    
I will return later to the idea of a ‘primordial’ non-object focused way of perceiving 
the world.  But first I will look at how object-oriented ontology thinkers talk about 
objects, focusing on the work of Graham Harman and Timothy Morton.  
 
Object-oriented ontology 
Harman defines an object minimally as an entity that ‘is irreducible both to its 
components and its effects’ (Harman 2016: 41).  For Harman, objects are not just 
amorphous ‘aggregates’; they are more than their components (though their 
components themselves can be objects, and they can be components in other larger 
objects – the cosmos is objects ‘all the way up and down’ (Harman 2005:19)).  But 
objects, he insists, are also more than their relations and effects – here he is 
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distinguishing himself from the strong relationality of writers such as Bruno Latour 
(1993) or Karen Barad (2007). In particular, objects ‘withdraw’ from humans – they 
are more, much more, than how we experience them.  The objects that Harman 
discusses typically behave in ways that conform to Spelke’s principles of cohesion, 
continuity, solidity and contact; but for Harman – and even more so for Morton – the 
object is not so much a spatio-temporal entity but a conceptual and metaphysical one.  
And more importantly, for Harman the task of speculative thought is to get beyond 
the natural-object perception of human beings – whether as investigated by 
psychologists like Spelke or by phenomenologists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Alphonso Lingis – to enquire about the deep hidden reality of objects. 
Harman’s project, like those of other speculative realists, is thus broadly anti-
Kantian, in the sense that it insists that we can talk about things in the world above 
and beyond how they appear to us as humans.  But in other ways his OOO is an 
extension of Kant’s project.  ‘Speculative realism’ as a wider movement takes its name 
from the argument made by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (1998) that 
‘speculative reason’ can think beyond direct human experience, in the realm of the 
‘supersensible’  – as long as it knows its own limits.  But also, in OOO it is not just 
humans that cannot fully encounter or ‘know’ things in themselves (Harman 2005: 
92-3).  Objects are also isolated from each other – they are ‘vacuum-sealed’ (2005: 2).   
If humans are fallen, only see the world ‘through a glass darkly’ (1 Corinthians 13:12), 
so too the whole cosmos is fallen.  Even where objects are made of other objects, they 
cannot fully know the objects that make them up (Harman 2005: 94).   
Corresponding roughly to the distinction between a ‘substance’ and its ‘relations’, 
Harman makes a distinction between the ‘real’ and the ‘sensual’ object.  The real 
object has independent existence, beyond its relations, and has ‘real qualities’, 
‘physical’ properties that make it what it is – that make it this rather than that kind of 
object.  The sensual object, by contrast, is the object as present to a mind or another 
object, so is dependent on another, encountering object, and has ‘sensory qualities’, 
which are contingent on the nature of that perceiving object.  Real objects cannot 
touch or interact with each other directly; neither can sensual objects.  But a real 
object can touch a sensual object.  
Harman presents his object-oriented ontology as resolving some problems with the 
‘new materialism’ of writers such as John Law, Annemarie Mol, Karen Barad and Jane 
Bennett.  I agree with Harman that the new materialist position is often guilty of 
‘duomining’ - a combination of ‘undermining’, treating objects as aggregates of their 
constituent parts (which leaves no room for the emergence of novel properties and 
powers) and ‘overmining’, reducing objects to their effects and relations (which 
leaves no space for change or for unactualised powers and potentialities) (Harman 
2016: 7-20).  I also agree that new materialism often privileges the human as creating 
multiple realities or collapsing them, and that we need to attend to how objects might 
relate to or withdraw from each other without human involvement. 
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But the object-focus of OOO is problematic for any serious treatment of continuous 
matter – rather like a procrustean mould into which we are forcing the unruly, 
amorphous material of continuous substance.  Harman suggests that we have a stark 
choice: objects or chaos.  He dismisses the idea that we can split the difference 
between objects and continua through the Henri Bergson’s concept of the virtual that 
is ‘both heterogeneous and continuous’, suggesting that this is trying to ‘have the 
many and the one simultaneously without paying the price’ (Harman 2010: 9).  
Harman seems to rule out the idea that anything interesting can be said about non-
individuated, continuous matter at all (Harman 2016: 19-20).  
Timothy Morton’s (2013) notion of ‘hyperobjects’ are arguably closer to what I am 
talking about.  Like Harman, Morton insists that his hyperobjects are real objects in 
their own right, real things even if not thought of.  And, like Harman, Morton treats 
all objects as in effect subjects, as encountering each other: he suggests that ‘all 
entities whatsoever are interconnected in an interobjective system’ (2013: 82).  But 
Morton’s hyperobjects are a specific kind of object, and one that is designed to stretch 
our concept of object, to include ‘things that are massively distributed in time and 
space relative to humans’ (2013: 1).   
Morton’s hyperobjects vex Spelke’s four principles of cohesion, continuity, solidity 
and contact to breaking point, leading us much closer to an ontology of continuous 
matter. Hyperobjects are not just big; they are discontinuous; like global warming, 
they can manifest in different unconnected places.  They occupy a multi-dimensional 
phase space so we can only see parts at a time. ‘Hyperobjects seem to come and go, 
but this coming and going is a function of our limited human access to them’ (Morton 
2013: 74)   Hyperobjects are ‘viscous’, ‘sticky’ – they breach the principle of contact, 
we cannot disentangle ourselves from them.  They also surround us, like the 
continuous, elemental media of air and water.   However, Morton’s concept of 
‘interobjectivity’ still implies an absolute rather than graded form of alterity and 
otherness, so will be of limited help understanding matter that displays various kinds 
of continuity.  And though the idea of the hyperobject might help us think about 
relations across boundaries between different material volumes, what about relations 
within continuous matter?  How can we talk about the material world that doesn’t 
assume either a structured object with internal coherence, or multiple objects in 
relation? In the next section I will shift focus from objects to continua, looking at the 
language we use to talk about continua in general – words such as substance, 
material, element and medium.  
 
Continua 
In this section I will explore two main modes in which continua enter human 
experience – as material for human projects, and as a background, environing 
condition of our planetary existence.  But let’s start by clarifying what we mean by 
calling these substances ‘continua’.  The word ‘continuous’, meaning ‘joined’ or 
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‘uninterrupted’ is related to ‘contain’, from the Latin continuus, literally ‘to hang 
together’.  Part of this continuity is about a lack of an external boundary: continuous 
media might be very big in comparison to the human scale, like the vast 
compartments of the earth system. Continua of any size might also lack a clear 
boundary, like the top of the atmosphere or the edge of a cloud.  
But the continuity of continua also refers to the lack of inner boundaries – of the 
‘ruptures’ implied by the word ‘inter-ruption’.  This is how ‘continuous’ is being used 
in ‘continuous-matter physics’. Continua are amorphous, without form – or are at 
least treated as such – so that even small or bounded entities can thus be regarded as 
continuous matter. Generally, this meaning of ‘continuous’ might lead us to focus on 
homogeneous substances, in a single phase of matter (solid, liquid or gas), perhaps 
chemically diverse but nevertheless mixed down to the molecular level.  Of these, 
some might be fluid, and when observed on human timescales lack any stable internal 
structure or boundaries; Others might be solid – volumes of rock or ice for example – 
but their amorphousness makes them similarly unamenable to object-thinking.    
But continua might also have inner structure. They might also be ‘colloids’: 
substances (mist, foam, sand, gel) that appear broadly homogeneous at one spatial 
scale, but at a smaller mesoscale have a complex topological structure usually 
involving matter in different phases (Szerszynski forthcoming).  Such colloids are not 
clearly bounded and structured objects; but neither are they more collections or 
assemblages, since as a mass they have emergent macroscale properties (Ostwald 
1917). Metals, though not strictly colloids, have a mesoscale structure of crystals. 
Other things we think of as ‘stuff’ might have macroscale heterogeneity but lack a 
regular or repeated internal structure (Prasada et al. 2002).  Even matter that has a 
clear compositional structure such as flesh (made out of organs and cells) or a crowd 
(made out of people) might also be treated as continuous in some circumstances. 
How do we talk about these? We saw above that the language we use of objects 
involves identity, quantification, predication, and a certain logic of relations.  The 
language we use about continuous matter is different. For a start, with continua 
people of all linguistic cultures typically use not count nouns but mass nouns, like 
‘water’, ‘air’, ‘rock’, ‘sand’, ‘metal’, which behave very differently.   One might 
generalise by saying that where we count objects, we measure continua.  Mass nouns 
cannot take the indefinite article (‘a’ or ‘an’) or a bare number; if we want to express 
quantity we have to add a ‘classifier’ or ‘unitizer’ – we say not ‘two waters’  but ‘two 
cups of water’ With mass nouns, identity and alterity also work differently: to express 
difference we say not ‘another water’ but ‘another cup of water’, or point to the 
continuum’s properties (‘fresh water’ versus ‘salty water’).  Mass nouns are also 
typically less tied to inner structure. In fact, mass nouns – especially the ones we are 
concerned with here, that refer to continuous matter – are often ‘nonatomic’, 
‘homomerous’ or ‘divisive’ in their reference: as Pelletier (2010: 124) puts it, ‘[m]ass 
terms … permit something that the mass term is true of to be arbitrarily subdivided 
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and the term to be true of these parts as well’: if we take a portion of mud and divide 
it, we are left with two portions of mud.   
We sometimes call continua ‘substances’.  ‘Substance’ is of course a term freighted 
with philosophical meaning; for any realist philosophy, substances are the 
fundamental things that underlie reality – substances literally ‘stand under’ the 
phenomenal world.  The pre-Socratics saw substance (ousia), as the stuff out of which 
things are made – whether water (Thales), or atoms (Democritus).  But for the 
Aristotle of the Categories (1963), primary, fundamental substances are particular  
concrete and individual objects, to which predicates such as kind (the secondary 
substance of universals), how many, and so on, can be attached.  In Aristotle’s later 
writings such as the Metaphysics (1956), substances are still objects, but now 
understood as a combination of matter and form, emphasising the idea that primary 
substances are not amorphous.  Harman with his ‘thing’ ontology in many ways 
continues the Aristotelian tradition of seeing objects as the primary substances.  In 
this view, objects can be made of other objects; but mere aggregates of objects that 
do not themselves have the status of an object – or the formless matter out of which 
objects are made – are not substances in this sense.   
I want to suggest that we typically relate to continua in one of two ways. Firstly, 
continua enter into our projects, as materials: we let them flow or gather them into 
stocks; we take them and pour them into containers; we mould them into forms or 
use them as ingredients.  Ingold lists the various materials used by nomadic 
pastoralists in making tents, so many of them mass nouns: bone, skin, hair, horn, 
dung (Ingold 2011: 25).  If we call these materials ‘substances’, then this is to invoke 
the latter’s non-philosophical, everyday meaning.  In Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1956), 
the closest concept to this meaning is probably not ousia but hyle, his material cause 
– that out of which something is made .  Aristotle’s model of making is hylomorphic 
– seeing objects as a combination of matter (hyle) and form (morph). But Ingold (2011) 
develops a rather different philosophy of materials and making. He emphasises the 
importance of understanding matter through not the consumption of completed 
objects (in which materials fade into the background) but their production (Ingold 
2011: 26). Viewed in this way, he suggests, materials become not passive recipients 
of form but active partners in the production of artefacts. 
The second main way that human beings encounter continua is as elemental media 
that surround and separate individuated objects like ourselves.  In Harman’s use of 
the term, an ‘element’ is a component, aspect or feature of a sensual object.  But 
Harman seems to open up the door to another meaning of ‘element’ by quoting 
Levinas’ concept of the ‘sensory ether’, suggesting that this ‘element has no forms 
containing it; it is content without form’ (Harman 2010).  The concept of element 
being alluded to here relates to another term, ‘medium’, which in Harman’s thought 
is the ontological site at which interaction between objects, and between wholes and 
parts, take place.  Here he is closer to the themes of this paper, but still subordinates 
what I am calling elemental media to the individuated objects that they surround.  
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Ingold can help us think about elemental media as things in and for themselves, as 
can media historian John Durham Peters. Ingold rejects an ontology that divides the 
world into objects that exist against a background landscape; instead, he builds on 
the suggestion of James Gibson (1979) that the fundamental categories of the 
phenomenological world are material (solid), medium (fluid) and the surfaces 
between them.  Ingold suggests that humans ‘swim’ in the plenum of a fundamentally 
material world, consisting of volumes of continuous matter with constant metabolic 
exchange between them (2011: 24). Peters for his part argues that elemental media 
play important ontological roles.  Depending on the kind of objects they surround, 
elemental media carry influences between the objects: they condition their 
properties, capacities and behaviour; they also separate them – thus contributing to 
their identity – and put them into relation.  Media, Peters suggests, are ‘our 
infrastructures of being, the habitats and materials through which we act and are’ 
(Peters 2015: 15).   
Nevertheless, it is not only objects that ‘withdraw’ from human knowability; it seems 
to be the case that, at least for entities such as ourselves, continua – whether in the 
form of material substances that are taken up into objects, or that of elemental media 
that surround and create the conditions of possibility for objects – also withdraw in 
their own way.  Whether they are inside or outside objects, continua tend to be 
backgrounded, forgotten, treated as merely infrastructural (ibid.: 34; see also Irigaray 
1999) – suggesting that their dismissal as ontologically irrelevant might paradoxically 
be a sign of their distinctive ontological status.  Later we will want to ask how 
substances are to themselves and each other.  But for now we will focus largely on 
how they appear to us.  In the next section I will explore the idea that the ‘mass-logic’ 
ontology of continuous matter might be more fundamental than the ‘count-logic’ 
ontology of objects: a continuous-matter ontology seems to organise the originary 
experience of human beings, but also endures as a grounding world-relation – 
especially if not occluded by object-oriented linguistic cultures.    
 
Sorting the world  
Many psychologists argue that human infants have the inborn capacity to make some 
sort of conceptual distinction between one object and another, and between object-
like things and substance-like things, largely based on how they seem to expect things 
to behave (for example Carey 2001).  However, philosopher Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 
argues that the primordial infantile experience of the world is not of objects, even of 
objects in motion, but motion itself – and especially our own tactile-kinesthetic sense 
of our self-moving.  As Sheets-Johnstone puts it, humans are ‘movement born’: we 
come into existence as subjects in the ‘primal animation’ of a tactile-kinesthetic body 
that feels its own movement (1999: 218). Being able to perceive, to act, to be 
intentional are based in our experience of that primal animation.   
12 
This suggests that our sense of bounded objects might be derivative, emerging firstly 
from our growing experience of our own moving, sensing body, and from sensory 
experience of other entities that seem to share our own animation.  Out of a primal 
animacy – and one which I will suggest is closer to the ‘mass’ logic of continuous 
substances than the ‘count’ logic of objects – we seem to develop a conception and 
understanding of other existents – whether objects or substances – through first our 
own embodied tactile-kinesthetic-sensory experience, and then through language.    
For while object perception in its most general sense is not dependent on language 
acquisition, it is certainly shaped profoundly by it.  In order for children to conceive 
of the world as made up of objects belonging to various kinds and having different 
properties, they have to learn not just to divide the world up into separate spatio-
temporal or functional particulars, but also what Quine called ‘divided reference’, 
where the same word is understood as referring to more than one entity – and also to 
the class of entities to which they all belong. Infants thus move from thinking and 
saying ‘dog’ to thinking and saying ‘this dog’, ‘another dog’, ‘two dogs’, ‘nice dog’ and 
‘dogs’ in general.  This linguistically mediated conceptual move is arguably necessary 
for understanding the concept of an object as used by OOO theorists – and it involves 
sortals and predicates.  Sortals are concepts that classify an entity of being of a 
particular ‘sort’ or ‘kind’ (dog, mother), whereas predicates are words that say 
something about the entity (such as ‘is good’). Sortals are typically stated or implied 
when we make statements of identity (‘Fido is a dog’, or ‘we are watching the same 
programme’) or quantification (‘there are three dogs’). In everyday speech we might 
use ‘object’ or ‘thing’ as a sortal, but for most philosophers ‘object’ is too vague to 
help with quantification or individuation.  Learning a language involves learning the 
logic of the more specific semantic terms that philosophers recognise as sortals, such 
as ‘book’, ‘dog’, ‘person’, ‘mother’, each of which have their own logic of 
individuation, quantification, persistence and causation, and thereby follow their 
own versions of Speke (Carey 2001).   
If understanding the concept of objects involves mastering predication and the 
singular–plural distinction, understanding the world as also including substances 
involves grasping the singular–mass distinction.  As we have seen above, mass nouns 
such as ‘water’, ‘air’, ‘rock’, but also ‘wool’, ‘technology’, ‘humanity’, can be objects 
or subjects in the grammatical sense, but behave differently to ‘count nouns’. And 
they can be far more mutable. As Quine puts it (in language which echoes Morton’s 
description of hyperobjects), mass nouns are ‘protean’ (ibid.: 90-1); they can shift in 
their sense from singular to plural, and often appear as a ‘single sprawling object’ 
(ibid.: 89).3  
This area of research is highly contested, but I want to suggest that perceiving the 
world in mass terms may be at least as primordial and foundational to human 
experience as an object-oriented ontology.  When infants first start to acquire speech, 
typically uttering ‘nominal occasion sentences’ consisting of a noun like ‘Mama’ or 
‘cup’, they chiefly use words as if they are names for individual entities, and in ways 
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that seem to blur the object–continua distinction – they only seem to have what 
Bowerman and Levinson (2001: 4) call ‘proto-concepts’ of objects and substances.  As 
Carey puts it, children ‘naming’ a cup or their mother seem to recognise existents 
‘which exemplify cuphood, or Mamaness, and have particular expectancies about 
objects with such properties, without representing Mama as a single enduring 
individual, or representing “cup” as a distinct sortal from “book”’ (Carey 2001: 203). 
Quine argues that these are mass in logic; as Quine puts it, for the infant, ‘the mother, 
red, and water are … all of a type; each is just a history of sporadic encounter, a 
scattered portion of what goes on’ (Quine 2013: 84).  Mass nouns and proper names 
have a similar logic: Quine suggests that in adult mass-noun constructions like ‘water 
is fluid’, ‘the mass term is much on a par with the singular term of “Mama is big” or 
“Agnes is a lamb”’ (Quine 2013: 89). 
But once infants acquire more language, these cognitive and experiential processes 
are developed and shaped in particular directions as the infants learn the grammatical 
rules of their first language (Carey 2001). The English language seems to have a bias 
towards spatio-temporal objects, and it is in English that the the contrast between 
count and mass maps most closely onto the distinction between objects and ‘stuff’ or 
materials (although there are exceptions, such as mass nouns that are collections of 
objects, like ‘furniture’) (Prasada et al. 2002: 147).  However, other languages are very 
different indeed; some languages seem to assume that the primary ‘substances’ (in 
the philosophical sense) are not individual spatio-temporal objects, but mass entities 
that ‘come and go’ like Morton’s hyperobjects.   These ‘classifier’ languages seem to 
take not objects but substances as their starting point.   
One example is Yucatec Maya, in which all inanimate nouns are treated like mass 
nouns. They cannot take plurals – just like amorphous substances such as water and 
sand, they have to be unitized with classifiers (think ‘two gallons of water’, ‘three 
buckets of sand’) before they can take a plural.  As Lucy puts it, ‘where English lexical 
structure routinely draws attention to shape, Yucatec lexical structure routinely draws 
attention to material’ (Lucy 1992: 89, emphasis in original). Something similar is the 
case with Japanese, in which all entities other than humans, regardless of whether 
they are an amorphous substance or a discrete object, have to be unitized before they 
can be quantified, and in which the default assumption when confronted by a new 
word is that it names not an object but a substance (Imai, Gentner 1997).    
Anthropologist Helen Verran’s discussion of West African languages such as Yoruba 
is very pertinent here.  Whereas in English, objects are basically spatiotemporal 
particulars to which qualities or predicates (including number) are applied, in Yoruba 
things are sortal particulars – that is, things which are defined as inherently 
possessing certain qualities according to their kind – to which only modal terms (i.e. 
modes of presentation) can be applied (Verran 2001: 137).  Thus, when an English 
speaker says it is sweet they are assigning a quality to a spatio-temporal particular; 
but in Yoruba ‘sweet’ is a verb – a sweet thing ‘sweets’, by its very nature. And 
numbers in Yoruba work less like adjectives than adverbs; they describe how things 
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appear: whether as a group or as a collection of individuals, and also as a collection 
of how many (Verran 2001: 67); a singular or plural is just the mode of appearance of 
a mass noun.  The ‘primary substances’ of Yoruba logic are discontinuous ‘sortal 
particulars’ that that present in mass, singular or plural modes.   What they are not, 
are objects in the conventional sense. There are echoes here of Ingold’s materials: 
while objects ‘exist’, he suggests, materials ‘occur’ (Ingold 2011: 30).   
Where does this leave us?  It is as if we humans start to experience the world in mass 
terms, rather than bounded, enduring objects belonging to kinds; then the experience 
of a human agent (both oneself and others) creates the space for thinking in terms of 
bounded objects; and object status is then (in ways that depend on the particular 
language acquired) extended to other animate and inanimate entities.  Some kind of 
object–substance split seems universal, as if required by human existence.  But 
continuous materials, while being backgrounded, especially in some linguistic 
cultures, remain as a fundamental strata of human experience.  We step into mud 
here and step into mud there – whether or not it is ‘the same’ mud, it is still mud.  
 
Continua in themselves 
So far I have mainly been talking about continua in human experience. But how can 
we think about substances apart from how we encounter them? In this section I will 
make four suggestions about how to talk and think about the secret inner life of 
continua, each organised around a contrast between the kind of concepts suitable for 
objects and those appropriate for continua.  I will suggest that object-oriented 
thought seems to prioritise concepts that are transcendent (relying on strong ideas of 
identity and alterity), exclusive (forbidding the simultaneous application of 
contradictory predicates), absolute (involving predicates that either apply or do not) 
and completed (regarding objects as the stable result of their ontogenesis).  By 
contrast, approaching the world as continua – as ‘stuff’ – requires concepts that 
emphasise the immanent (relations internal to an entity), the inclusive (permitting the 
coexistence of contrasting or contradictory properties), the gradual (allowing 
properties to manifest differentially at different points) and the generative (involving 
the constant production of form).  This contrast between object-thinking and 
continua-thinking is not a strict one, and is more like a first approximation to 
stimulate speculation.  However, I will suggest in the conclusion that the very leakage 
of these ways of thinking across the object–continua divide suggests that starting 
speculation from continuous matter rather than from objects can also change the way 
we think about objects. 
 
Immanent 
Firstly, with continua we are compelled to think about ‘immanent’ properties and 
relations. As we saw, regarding the world as made of individuated, self-identical 
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objects requires a logic of 'divided reference’ – and this involves a number of 
conceptual separations or transcendences.  An object transcends the subject before 
which it is placed; it also exists in relations of alterity and difference with other 
objects; it also transcend the sortals or kind to which they belong.  By contrast, I want 
to suggest, thinking about continuous matter requires us to use concepts that are 
more immanent in character. 
I am not using the word immanence to necessarily imply a ‘flat ontology’ of radical 
immanence.  I am simply using the term to emphasise that the emphasis with 
continua is not on identity and alterity, and relations with other entities, but about 
differences and relations that are internal to a region.4  Furthermore, to be clear, the 
immanence-transcendence contrast as I am using it here does not map onto that 
between internal and external relations.  In the logic of relations, ‘internal’ relations 
are not necessarily spatio-temporally internal to an entity.  Indeed, examples of 
internal relations usually involve relations between separate objects (such as ‘mother’ 
and ‘daughter’) – though they might also obtain between universals or continua. 
What makes a relation between two entities internal to one of them is whether it is a 
necessary part of that entity being what it is (relative to the kind of sortal to which it 
belongs), or is merely contingent and thus ‘external’.  For Harman, the sensual object 
– the object as it is for us – is inherently relational by definition; But the ‘real’ object 
and its ‘real’ properties are non-relational – they involve neither internal nor external 
relations (Harman, in Brassier et al. 2007).  The one qualification that Harman is likely 
to make here is that an object might have a set of internal (i.e. non-accidental) 
immanent relations with its components – what Harman calls ‘domestic relations’, 
and Bryant ‘endo-relations’ (Bryant 2011: 68) – that makes it the kind that of object 
that is.   
One way to see the transcendent–immanent contrast applying to the way we talk 
about objects and continua involves the application of comparatives.  It’s not a 
perfect mapping, but objects seem to have an affinity to external comparisons (‘x is 
y-er than z’), whereas continua encourage ‘internal comparatives’, a kind of reflexive 
comparison in which entities are compared to themselves at other points in time or 
space (see Tabatowski 2019:).  In talking about continua, for example, we might say 
that this metal is harder than that metal, but we might also make internal 
comparisons – ‘the water is colder here than over there’, or ‘the water is warmer than 
it was this morning’. With continua, it seems, internal comparisons may be internal 




Secondly, with continua we seem to need to apply predications that overlap with each 
other in ways that we would not do with determinate objects.  The concepts that we 
use to think and talk about classic, individuated objects belonging to kinds are likely 
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to obey the classical ‘rules of thought’ of identity (A=A), noncontradiction (A≠¬A) and 
excluded middle (A∨¬A).  In other words: objects are identical to themselves; 
statements about objects cannot be both true and false at the same time; and if 
statements are not true they are false and vice versa. With continua and their internal 
contrasts, by comparison, we seem to be pulled into a more inclusive logic, where 
contradictory predicates may simultaneously apply.   
One way to capture this contrast is through the concept of ‘internal difference’ or 
‘difference in itself’. Hegel and Deleuze, despite the huge differences between their 
philosophies, both critique a form of representational, propositional logic that only 
sees difference as a negation of identity and as thus derivative.  Hegel contrasts an 
‘ordinary’ or ‘ratiocinative thought’ that starts from identity with ‘speculative 
thought’, which for him involves abandoning the principle of noncontradiction and 
sees Being as itself contradictory (Hegel 1977: 35), Central to Hegel’s argument here 
is the unsettling of the very logic of subject and predicate, as stabilised by the knowing 
subject (Hegel 1977: 38; 2010: 67). For his part, Deleuze develops Henri Bergson’s 
concept of ‘multiplicity’ into an idea of ‘difference in itself’. In The Logic of Sense, he 
asks us to contrast two ways of thinking about the relation between difference and 
similitude – “only that which resembles differs” and “only differences can resemble 
each other” – suggesting that these represent two radically different ways of looking 
at the world: the first ‘invites us to think difference from the standpoint of a previous 
similitude or identity’, the second ‘to think similitude and even identity as the 
product of a deep disparity’ (1990: 261) – Deleuze firmly aligning himself with the 
latter.  
Investigating and thinking about continua repeatedly confronts us with the task of 
grappling with a logic of differentiality and contradiction – of how to conceive and 
talk of entities that seem able to bear contradictory properties at different times or 
even at the same time – rigidity and plasticity, fluidity and solidity, transience and 
persistence, heat and cold, continuity and discontinuity.  We need ways of talking 
about how continua can be ‘other to’, or ‘out of step with’, themselves. 
 
Gradual 
Thirdly, in ways that build on the first two characteristics I have outlined above – 
immanence and inclusivity – concepts suitable for continua tend to involve matters 
of degree.  For contrast, let’s once again start by considering the logic of individuated 
objects. In the subsection on immanence above, I said that, whereas with objects we 
might use gradable external comparatives – ‘X is taller, heavier, greener etc. than y’ – 
with continua we might more typically us gradable internal comparatives – ‘X is colder 
[than itself]’.  But here I want to shift the focus a bit, suggesting that when we think 
about Harman’s determinate ‘real’ objects the intuitive starting place is in fact the 
application of nongradable, absolute adjectives, and the use of gradable adjectives 
that invite external comparisons is secondary, external, accidental.  
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By contrast, in the case of continua, right from the beginning we are likely to be drawn 
to gradable predicates – ones that apply to their subjects to a greater or lesser degree 
– hot, heavy, viscous, rigid, moving (Kennedy, Louise 2005).  With continua – whether 
encountered as material for a project or as a surrounding, elemental medium, or 
thought of speculatively in itself – it is not so much about whether something is heavy 
or light, hot or cold, but how heavy, how light. And, what is more, different parts of a 
given volume of continuous matter might exhibit these qualities to a different degree.  
As we move through continua, we might be drawn to using ‘degree achievement’ 
terms, such as ‘widen’, ‘narrow’, ‘darken’ or ‘warm’, to describe the shifting degree to 
which the material has a given property (Deo et al. 2013: 97). We can do this with 
objects too –for example we might say ‘the cake gets sweeter towards the bottom’ – 
thus treating them for certain purposes as continuous matter.    
In ways that prefigure the next subsection on the ‘generative’, the grammar of these 
degree achievement terms – ‘widen’, darken’ – seem to imply change.  However, the 
continuous, gradual nature of internal difference within continua is not solely a 
matter of change over time: it can involve continuous variation along diverse ‘axes’ 
– some temporal, some spatial, some neither.  This brings us into the realm of 
‘gradients’. The term ‘gradient’ was initially used to refer to the steepness of slope of 
a railway, then applied by extension to barometric pressure, and finally became a 
central concept in mathematical physics, defined as the rate of change of a variable 
with respect to a change of position across a field.   
Harman is dismissive of the concept of continua and gradients, suggesting that we 
need discontinuities in the world in order to be able to speak about it.  ‘Everything is 
split up according to definite boundaries and cut-off points rather than along 
continuous gradients’, he insists (2016: 15); and the world’s capacity to generate 
complexity and surprise ‘must be due to fully formed individuals at every scale’ (2016: 
20).  Harman presents us with a stark choice – either we accept that the world is made 
of individuated objects with real properties that are not fully knowable, or we are 
forced to regard it as an undifferentiated plenum whose properties are fully on display 
in whatever it happens to be doing at any one time. 
The concept of ‘field’ – crucial in continuous-matter physics – can help us avoid 
Harman’s application of the either-or logic of the excluded middle here.  Field 
concepts can suggest ways of moving from the transcendent, inclusive and absolute 
language of properties of and relations between individuated, countable objects, 
towards ideas of wider relations within a continuum.  With continuous matter 
thinking it is not just the matter that is regarded as continuous; difference and 
relation have also to be conceptualised continuously, and the idea of fields provides 
one way of doing that. 
As historian of science Mary Hesse summarises, in mathematical physics a field is ‘a 
region of space in which each point … is characterised by some quantity or quantities 
which are functions of the space coordinates and· of time’ (Hesse 1962: 192).  Fields 
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were first posited as a way of understanding the motion of fluids. In Leonhard Euler’s 
Mechanica of 1736, a fluid was analysed not as corpuscular matter, but as a continuous 
substance, treating its volume as an evolving field in which properties and forces were 
differentially present at each point (Hesse 1962: 192-3).  In 1845 George Stokes 
showed how this way of thinking also applied to solid media, and in 1851 William 
Thomson formalised and generalised the concept of the field, showing that the same 
equations work across very different fields, including those like electromagnetism 
that can exist in empty space (Hesse 1962: 195, 209).  
Fields can be seen as a meshwork of gradients that collectively summarise the forces 
that are at play at each individual point in the continuous field; but they also express 
non-individuated relations of multiplicity across a volume of continuous matter. 
Field thinking was a new ontology, one that pushed physics beyond the mechanical 
philosophy of Newton and carved out the possibility of something being ‘physical’ 
even when not material, and of ‘energy’ as something that can exist even where there 
was no matter (McMullin 2002). Field equations were not the Newtonian equations of 
reversible motion, radiating forces and instant action, but those of flow, viscosity and 
elasticity, and action that takes time to unfold depending on the nature of the 
material (McMullin 2002: 28; Hesse 1962: 196). Field relations are crucial for 
understanding the internal motion of fluid media, but also the immobility of static 
continua, especially when held in the dynamic equilibrium of balanced forces.  
The mathematical physics of fields is of course a historical, contingent human 
creation (Mirowski 1989), and one whose operation is inseparable from apparatuses 
and human performances (Barad 2007). However, no less than the experience of 
human embodiment or of human craft practices, it can be fertile ground for 
speculative thought. If continua have something analogous to the countable relations 
that obtain between individuated objects – both ‘domestic’ (interior) and ‘foreign’ 
(exterior), and both internal (necessary) and external (contingent) – then field 
ontologies can help us conceive of these: as a set of continuous relationships between 
points and regions and properties of a substance, some of which are inherent to what 
makes an example of continuous matter what it is, and some accidental.  
 
Generative 
Fourthly, with continua, even more than with objects, we have to think about 
potentiality. Harman’s object-oriented ontology focuses on the completed object, and 
thus prioritises being over becoming (Harman 2016: 21). In Gilbert Simondon’s (1964) 
philosophy of the object, by contrast, it is the process of ontogenesis that is 
metaphysically prior, and the concrete individual only has a ‘relative reality’, as an 
effect or phase of that wider process. He suggests that we should thus ‘understand the 
individual from the perspective of the process of individuation rather than the process 
of individuation by means of the individual’ (1992: 300).  With continua, I want to 
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suggest, we are even more firmly compelled to place a priority not on being but 
becoming, not on the actual but the potential.  
Aristotle in his Metaphysics identified formless matter with potentiality and the 
formed body with actuality – for example, regarding building materials as a potential 
house (Aristotle 1956: 1050a). However, in Aristotle’s hylomorphic schema, hyle 
(matter) is seen as passive, and its potential as ultimately derivative of the objects of 
which it may become part. By contrast, I want to suggest that continua have 
potentialities that belong to the continua themselves.  
Crucial to the generative potentiality of continua are their ‘intensive’ properties. The 
concept of the intensive was first elaborated by the physicist Richard Chase Tolman 
(1917).  ‘Extensive’ properties are properties such as length, volume and mass that are 
additive – for example the mass of any entity or aggregate is the sum of the mass of 
its components.  By contrast, ‘intensive’ properties such as temperature, pressure and 
density (and others listed above as characteristic properties of continuous matter 
such as viscosity, surface tension, elasticity and rigidity) are independent of system 
size – for example, the temperature of an entity is not the sum of the temperatures of 
its components.    
Deleuze linked Chase’s concept of the intensive with Bergson’s (1921) 
conceptualisation of difference as an explosive force within things that creatively and 
inventively generates novelty.  Deleuze also takes from Bergson the idea of the 
‘virtual’ as a way to understand this genesis of new forms; virtualities are latent but 
already real, present in the world, even though they may or may not be actualised 
(Deleuze 1988). Deleuze and Guattari bring out the way that extensive properties are 
more characteristic of the stable, actual, completed form of an object, whereas 
intensive properties are more associated with virtuality and becoming, as they cannot 
be altered without limit without introducing bifurcations and changes in kind (e.g. 
Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 33).   
In the partial differential equations used in mathematical physics to express relations 
within gradients and fields, the variables seen as independent are generally extensive 
and the ones seen as dependent (such as like temperature, pressure or electrical 
charge) are generally intensive – as if the extensive, actual, mass and spatial 
configuration of an entity is the metaphysical ground out of which intensive forces 
are generated and on which they play.   But in continuous matter the relationship 
between the extensive and the intensive is more complex. 
For example, in fluid continua held away from equilibrium by a flow of energy there 
is a constant restless dance between the extensive and the intensive, the actual and 
the virtual. Simondon can help us here, arguing as he does that becoming takes place 
‘in a system that contains latent potentials and harbors a certain incompatibility with 
itself’, and is always only ‘a partial and relative resolution’ (1992: 300). Becoming, 
then, is ‘a capacity beings possess of falling out of step with themselves …, of 
resolving themselves by the very act of falling out of step’  (ibid.: 300-1).  Planetary 
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continua such as the atmosphere are kept ‘out of step with themselves’ by the flow of 
energy through the Earth system from the sun and the Earth’s hot core, and are thus 
constantly involved in generating new forms of multiplicity within themselves.  
Under such conditions, ‘fleeting emergent powers’ (Elder-Vass 2005) continually 
arise, as virtual singularities divide the planet’s matter and shape its behaviour into 
different emergent phenomena, as fluid matter slides over and confronts itself in 
phenomena such as storms, avalanches and inversion layers, without these powers 
being gathered into stable or self-reproducing entities.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have pursued the idea that a speculative ontology focused on objects 
might not be able to do justice to continuous matter, whether considered in its role 
in human experience or in terms of its own inner nature. As human beings, we 
encounter continuous matter as material to be incorporated into our artefacts and 
projects; we also experience continua as constituting the environments and 
infrastructural backgrounds that surround us and condition our existence and powers, 
and those of the other objects that make up our world.  We should also, I have 
suggested, direct speculative attention to the inner life of unbounded, continuous 
matter, going on even where no individuated objects or subjects are present.  My 
conclusion is that it is a mistake to see continuous matter as just ‘disappearing’ into 
objects without remainder – whether as an actual or potential part of an object, or as 
a collection of objects – and thus as lacking ontological significance as an object of 
philosophical thought. I have shown how insights from psychology, anthropology and 
linguistics support the idea that a mass-noun ontology of continuous substances 
might be an intrinsic feature of human experience – once which is shaped, perhaps 
backgrounded and sometimes even dimmed by language and culture, but is never far 
away.  I have also drawn on ideas from continuous-matter physics to see how we 
might develop concepts that can serve in our continuous-matter philosophy as 
analogues to the concepts that we use for discrete objects – identity, difference, 
relation, number and so on. 
Over the course of the paper I have made some provisional contrasts between the sort 
of concepts that seem to be involved in thinking about objects, and those that seem 
to be needed for engaging with continua.  We might summarise (and simplify) these 
contrasts as follows: Objects are individuated; continua are non-individuated. 
Objects are countable; continua are measurable.  Objects are structured; continua are 
unstructured. Objects ‘exist’; continua ‘occur’. Objects invite external comparisons; 
continua call for internal, reflexive comparisons. Objects take noncontradictory 
predicates; continua exhibit contradictory properties. Objects have countable 
relations; continua have continuous, ‘field’ relations. Objects take nongradable 
predicates; continua take gradable predicates. Objects are fundamentally extensive; 
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continua are fundamentally intensive. Objects are completed, continua are in 
formation. Objects are actual; continua are virtual.   
Of course, all of these are generalisations: in each case we can probably think of 
exceptions. But note that the exceptions are usually on the side of the objects: objects 
too are in formation, can change, have internal comparisons, can take gradable 
adjectives. And there are at least two ways of looking at this asymmetry. Echoing 
Deleuze’s suggestion that the world looks very different if we look at the relation 
between identity and difference from the side of identity and similitude or from the 
side of difference, and Simondon’s similar observation about the relation between the 
individual and individuation, we can similarly approach the object-continua relation 
either from the side of objects, or from the side of continua.   
The key objective of developing a continuous-matter philosophy is arguably to give 
continuous matter its due – to see it as more than a potential object, part of an object, 
or in some other way falling short of object status.  But a continuous-matter 
philosophy can also change the way we think about objects.  Continuous-matter 
philosophy does not necessarily involve rejecting the reality of objects – does not 
necessarily reduce them to illusory epiphenomena of fundamentally continuous 
phenomena, as often seems to be implied by thinkers such as Simondon (1992: 300) 
or Bennett (2010: 227).  However, if we turn our philosophical point of view around, 
looking at objects from a starting point based in continuous matter rather than the 
other way round, we may find that objects, too, start to look more strange and 
interesting. 
Notes 
1 Many thanks to Tim Ingold, Luke Moffat and the anonymous referees for extremely helpful 
comments on an earlier draft, though I take full responsibility for the final product.  
2 All etymological derivations in this paper are from https://www.etymonline.com.  
3 Quine’s ontology was of course a ‘thing’ ontology – for him there are only objects and sets. 
4 Although with continuous matter the distinction between internal and external in this sense 
is not always so sharp. 
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